

AIR

SECURITY INFORMATION

SR/22
WOK-# 12941

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27 February 1952

Chief of Station, Frankfurt

Attn: GSGB

Chief, SR

Chief, EM

REDSOC/AERODYNAMIC/OPERATIONAL

Attachments of Contact Reports between CASSOWARY 2 and

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Attached are two contact reports between CASSOWARY 2 and □ □
Attachment A covers conference between CASSOWARY 2 and □ □ on 23
February and Attachment B covers conference between CASSOWARY 2 and
□ □ on 26 January.

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ATTACHMENT A

Conference with CASSOWARY 2, 23 February 1952

1. [] met CASSOWARY 2 on 23 February 1952. CASSOWARY 15 was present throughout the conference. The following is a resume of the subjects discussed.

a. [] stated that overriding operational considerations necessitate that an immediate decision be made on sending two CASSOWARY 1 members who are now in training in Munich to London for the purpose of participating in a joint dispatch team. CASSOWARY 2 was reminded that in New York he had agreed that the avoidance of the duplication of effort was highly desirable. CASSOWARY 2's immediate reaction was "why do you come and ask me. I am not informed of operational developments and am in no position to make such decisions. However if it is for technical purposes that you want to take the CASSOWARY 1 men to London for training, I see no objection to that". [] stated that it was for the overall technical operational reasons that we wanted to have a joint dispatch. Of course, this meant that the CASSOWARY 1 men would make up a joint team with CAVATINA personnel. To this clarification CASSOWARY 2 reacted negatively. He stated that he saw no reasons why the CAVATINA people should be accepted blindly. He did not know who the CAVATINA personnel were nor was he familiar with the developments of the CAVATINA W/T contact with the homeland. Until such time as he could examine the situation and was properly informed he did not agree to a mixed team.

b. CASSOWARY 2 stated during the New York conference he agreed to explore the possibility of joint teams and avoid further duplication of operations into the Ukraine. He wanted particularly to point out that he said "explore the possibility", that he did not make any advance agreements on joint teams or his own acceptance of an operational position or his acceptance of working with CAVATINA 5 if the latter was to be appointed by CAVATINA as their operational representative. He stated that he had received a letter from CASSOWARY 3 stating that all of the above points were presented to him by our representatives in Munich as being accepted by CASSOWARY 2. This was not in accordance with the discussions held in New York.

c. CASSOWARY 2 said that he still would be very pleased to meet with CAVATINA representatives and explore the possibilities of joint operations. If he was permitted to examine all of the CAVATINA traffic with the homeland he could then make an intelligent decision on the desirability of joint operations.

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Without being fully informed, he believes that there is better than a 50-50 chance that the CAVATINA contact is controlled by MGB or if not actually controlled, has been isolated by MGB and may serve as a Soviet trap for all future Ukrainian operations. He further wanted to point out that during the last operation GAWNPOR 6 refused to accept CAVATINA's couriers. What would then be the purpose of having a CAVATINA courier head a joint team? The GASSOWARY 1 group leader who is now in Munich (GASSOWARY 2 refers to this individual as CARTHAGE 3's friend) is a personal friend of GAWNPOR 6 and is familiar with at least twenty or thirty partisan leaders. He had been in the Ukraine in 1950 and knows the local situation. He has the confidence of GASSOWARY 3 and GASSOWARY 2. GASSOWARY 2 therefore feels that the GASSOWARY 1 team without being mixed with CAVATINA personnel may have a better than 50-50 chance of success. He fails to see what the acceptance of CAVATINA personnel in a mixed team would contribute to the success of the operation but he claims to see many factors which make the acceptance of CAVATINA people detrimental to the success of the spring operation. GASSOWARY 2 requests that under no circumstances should CAVATINA be informed of the date and place of our operation.

d. GASSOWARY 2 said that the matter of coordination of dispatch is between the British intelligence and us and does not involve any negotiations with CAVATINA. The dispatch definitely should be coordinated. He is conscious that two dispatches may increase the local round-ups; however he feels that one dispatch would also result in round-ups. Therefore he does not consider the scale of round-ups would warrant the sacrifice of an independent planned dispatch to a mixed team dispatch. GASSOWARY 2 stated that he has received two letters from CAVATINA 2. In these letters CAVATINA 2 stated that he understood that GASSOWARY 1 was interested in asking CAVATINA to accept one member on the CAVATINA team and also to have the CAVATINA team carry some GASSOWARY 1 mail. GASSOWARY 2 stated that he does not know of such a request on the part of GASSOWARY 1 and apparently CAVATINA 2 somewhat twisted the facts. As far as GASSOWARY 2 is concerned he would always be pleased to give as much literature to the CAVATINA team to carry as they could possibly handle. GASSOWARY 2 stated that if he was allowed by CAVATINA to examine all previous traffic with the homeland, he may recommend to CAVATINA that no further operations take place based on the current W/T contact. On the other hand, if after an examination of this traffic he believed that the contact was clean he might recommend that future operations be joint operations. But until such time as he is informed on the current situation he would make no blind decisions.

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e. As an example of the confused operational situation in the Ukraine, CASSOWARY 2 stated that he has received a copy of the British Intelligence information bulletin. An item in this bulletin claims as a fact that the NVD troops have been laying artillery barrages in the forest area between LVOV and KIEV. The purpose of this bombardment was to break up CANNPORE 3 concentrations hiding in the forest. CASSOWARY 2 would like to know from what source the British Intelligence received this information and whether this information was gathered through the CAVATINA contact with the homeland. In view of the fact that he knows of no CANNPORE 3 activity in the KIEV area, he believes that this report is fantastic.

2. The above discussion was summarized and CASSOWARY 2 confirmed, for the purpose of record, that the following are his personal views:

- a. Without fully being informed on the CAVATINA operations he would not agree to a mixed dispatch team.
- b. An independent CASSOWARY 1 team should be dispatched this spring.
- c. The team should be instructed to ask CANNPORE 3 headquarters to make an immediate decision on which channel they wish to use for communications with the outside world.
- d. He is ready to meet CAVATINA representatives at any time to discuss the possibility of joint operations.

3. CASSOWARY 2 did not make a major issue of the difficulties encountered in getting a re-entry permit for his proposed trip to Europe. He stated that he was not informed about what charges the Immigration officials have against him. He claims to have been instructed by [] in 1949 to come to the U. S. under a false name and also under a false biographic background. [] promised to straighten the matter out with the proper U. S. officials. After arriving in the U.S. under a false name, CASSOWARY 2 was contacted by DIMACAGO, at which time he was requested to fill out a new set of papers under his real name. After consulting with [] he complied with DIMACAGO's request. He does not understand what charges the U.S. Government has against him at the present time and is very anxious to clear his name. He is quite worried about the possibility of having deportation hanging over him and is most anxious to take the matter up in court and settle it. [] promised that this organization would try to find out what charges the Immigration authorities have against him and that in the near future he would be informed of these charges and would be requested to answer them in writing. In the meantime CASSOWARY 2 said he would not take any action until further informed by us.

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4. CASSOWARY 2 referred to the Psychological Warfare Conference which he has been attending in the Washington Hotel and which was called by Representatives Armstrong and Kristen. He said he felt that the whole conference was being run by C 2 and was purely a Great Russian show to which the Ukrainians were not given an opportunity to present their case. He said he was shocked by the fact that the U. S. Government permitted such undemocratic procedures. However he said that he understood that the undersigned was mainly interested in the operational phase of our cooperation and that political matters should properly be taken up with John M. FICHANDLER. STUBBS said that he was correct in his deduction and the present conference was to be confined purely to operational matters. CASSOWARY 2 stated that he would be pleased to see FICHANDLER at any time if FICHANDLER has been able to learn some additional facts on the U. S. foreign policy from DEMARCON, outside the usual self-determination policy which has been continuously repeated and does not offer a solution to the Ukrainian national aspirations.

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